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Comments
State Health Inspections
and "Unreasonable Search":

The Frank Exclusion of Civil Searches
"Unreasonable search" is a constitutional concept of imprecise and
fluctuating content. The distinguishing characteristics of that concept and the scope of its application to state officials have been the
subject of a developing, but unreliable, body of law. The United
States Supreme Court, in Frank v. Maryland,' recently added a new,
and perhaps too rigid, dimension to the concept of unreasonableness
by finding a constitutional difference between searches designed to
enforce "civil" regulations and searches for "criminal"evidence. The
same case also invited clarification of the federal constitutional
standard to be applied to searches by state officials; but the Court's
decision merely perpetuated the uncertainty that began with Wolf
v. Colorado.2
In Frank, a divided Court upheld a homeowner's conviction for
refusing to permit examination of his home by a health inspector who
demanded entry without warrant pursuant to the power of entry
provided by a Baltimore health ordinance.3 Rejecting the defendant's claim of protection under the fourth and fourteenth amend1. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
2. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
3. The inspector had good reason to suspect rat infestation violative of BAmnOR,
MD., Crrv CODE, art. 12, § 112 (1950), which provides:
Every dwelling and every part thereof shall be kept clean and free from any
accumulation of dirt, filth, rubbish, garbish, or similar matter, and shall be kept
free from vermin or rodent infestation.
That section was normally enforced by a system of inspections and warning notices
designed to induce compliance. Defendant's refusal to allow inspection resulted in
his conviction by a Baltimore police court and by the Criminal Court, Part II of
Baltimore, on de novo review, for violation of BALTIMORE, MD., CrT CODE, art. 12 §

120 (1950), which provides:
Whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect that a nuisance
exists in any house, cellar, or enclosure, he may demand entry therein in the day
time, and if the owner or occupier shall refuse or delay to open the same and
admit a free examination, he shall forfeit and pay for every such refusal the sum
of Twenty Dollars.
Defendant claimed that the conviction violated his rights under the twenty-third and
twenty-sixth articles of the declaration of rights of the Maryland Constitution, as well
as under the fourth and fourteenth amendments of the federal constitution. The Mary-
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ments,4 Mr. Justice Frankfurter reasoned that although the interest

protected by the fourth amendment is the privacy of the individual,

the historical background of that provision indicates that the "unreasonable searches" 5 which it prohibits include only searches for

evidence to be used in criminal proceedings. The "broad restraints
of due process" 6 do not restrain the states where there has been long
public acceptance of "civil" searches in the enforcement of municipal
regulations. The Court concluded that privacy was not "unreason-

ably" interfered with, for these limited powers of inspection, 7 exerland Court of Appeals denied certiorari without opinion, by endorsement on the
petition (B. 170). Brief for Appellant, Jurisdictional Statement, p. 9, Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). Denial of certiorari was probably based on the decision
of the Maryland court in Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1955),
discussed at note 58 infra.
The inspector warned defendant (Record, p. 10) by reading him BALT OR, MD.,
CrrY CODE, art. 12, § 6 (1950), which provides in part:
If any person shall knowingly obstruct or resist the Commissioner of Health, or
any person by him appointed. . . such persons shall forfeit and pay a sum not
exceeding Two Hundred Dollars.
The state's use of BALTnmoRE, MD., Crry CODE, art. 12, § 120 (1950) in prosecuting
defendant may be explained by considering District of Columbia v. Little, 389 U.S.
1 (1950), where the United States Supreme Court held that an ordinance provision
similar to that last-quoted had not been violated because "refusing entry" was not
an "interference." But the availability of § 6 as a means of coercing home owners
in situations where there is questionable "cause to suspect a nuisance" puts much
greater power in the hands of an overly-enthusiastic health inspector.
4. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things
to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
No State shall . .. deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5. The first clause of the fourth amendment "is general and forbids every search
that is unreasonable .. ",and the second clause emphasizes the purpose of the
first. Go-Bart v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931). "There is no formula for
the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and
circumstances." Ibid. See also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950).
State courts have occasionally distinguished "inspections" from "searches" when
construing state constitutional protections against search and seizure. See Sister
Felicitas v. Hartridge, 148 Ga. 832, 98 S.E. 538 (1919). But see District of Columbia
v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 18 (1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950). The
Court in Frank relied on no such argument, and seemed to assume that an inspection" is a "search."
6. 359 U.S. at 363.
7. BAITTimoE, MD., CrrT CODE, art. 12, § 120 (1950), limits the inspection powers
of health officials: the inspection must be in the daytime; there must be reasonable
grounds for suspecting the presence of a nuisance. See note 3 supra. From the ordinance, in addition to these limitations, the Court implied the further limitation that
inspecting officers are not authorized to exercise force in obtaining entry. 359 U.S.
at 366-67.
There is no question that the health inspector in Frank had reasonable grounds
for suspecting a nuisance. Uncontested evidence in the lower court indicated that the
house was in an "extreme state of decay"; collections of debris, openings at the base
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cised in response to the increasing needs of a crowding population,
"touch at most upon the periphery of the important interests safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment....
The precise scope of the fourth amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable searches," as it applies to state officials, has been
uncertain since Wolf v. Colorado ruled that "the security of one's
privacy . . . the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free
society [and] is therefore

. . .

enforceable against the States

through the Due Process Clause." 9 The Frank case does not dispel

of the house, and a pile of "rodent feces mixed with straw and trash and debris to
approximately half a ton" in the back yard created a strong probability of rat infestation. But the Court, in emphasizing the presence of rodent feces as a basis for "cause
to suspect" a nuisance, failed to point out that the inspector first referred to the rodent
feces as "probably chinchilla," and in subsequent testimony refused to use a more
precise term than "rodent feces." Record, p. 9. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that
the Court would support an inspector's discretionary determination of "cause" on
evidence somewhat weaker than that which, on analysis of the opinion alone, seemed
to be before the Court.
8. 859 U.S. at 367.
Mr. Justice Whittaker concurred in the opinion on the basis that the conviction
did not enforce a power of "unreasonable search," making clear that his understanding
of the opinion was that it in no way qualified the force of Wolf v. Colorado. It may
be significant that in evaluating the "reasonableness" of the power of search, he did
not mention Mr. Justice Frankfurter's important distinction between searches for
"civil" and "criminal" evidence, discussed infra. Thus, that distinction may yet be
subject to revision.
Mr. Justice Douglas writing for the four dissenters, urged that both history and
current authority show that the fourth amendment protects the privacy and dignity
of the individual from invasion by "officious" government officers, without distinguishing between searches for "civil' or "criminal" evidence. 359 U.S. at 374-82. Constitutional protections should not yield to the "official's measure of his own need," for
that measure "often does not square with the Bill of Rights." Id. at 882. The dissent
particularly objected to the fact that there were adequate grounds and opportunity
for the inspector to obtain a warrant if he had chosen to do so; and pointed out that
the need for a power of entry for health inspectors is questionable, since they are
seldom denied entry. Id. at 881, 882 & 383. Finally, the dissenters adopted the court's
argument in District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16-17 (D.C. Cir. 1949): "To
say that a man suspected of a crime has a right to protection against search of his
home without warrant, but that a man not suspected of crime has no such protection,
is a fantastic absurdity." 359 U.S. at 878.
9. 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
A hotly-debated "uncertainty" is that involved in predicting the effect of Wolf
v. Colorado on the rules respecting the admissibility ofillegally seized evidence. See
Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and
Federal Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1083, 1128 (1959): "Wolf teaches us that some
fundamental rights are less 'undamenta' . . . less 'immutabl . . . less 'basic? than
others. That evidence is not to be excluded unless it was obtained in violation of
sub-minimal standards ... . Irvine teaches us that . . . only when such violations
are sufficiently 'incredible' and 'flagrant' do we exclude their fruits."
Professor Kamisar is particularly concerned with the uncertain effect of Wolf upon
the doctrines expressed in Lustig v. United States, 388 U.S. 74 (1949), and Byars
v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), which would allow federal prosecution upon
evidence illegally seized by state officers if presented to federal authorities on a
"silver platter." Id., commencing at 1129.
Any distinction drawn between the "remedy" of exclusion of evidence and the
federal "right," as it is abstractly recognized in Wolf, may be somewhat formalistic.
Compare Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29 (1949) ("We must hesitate to treat this
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that uncertainty. Rather, the Court's ambiguous references to the
relationship between the fourth and fourteenth amendments 10 typify
the method by which the Court, after throwing the question open in
Wolf, has avoided clarifying the extent to which the fourth amendment's protections are "incorporated" in the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.:" Thus, Frank could reasonably be regarded as support for the alternative propositions that: (1) the
protections from unreasonable search required by the fourth amendment are substantially "incorporated" in the fourteenth amendment,
but are not violated by the power of search enforced in Frank;12 or
remedy [exclusion of evidence] as an essential ingredient of the right"), with Allen,
The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ITL. L.
REv. 1, 9 (1950):
[I]n rejecting the exclusionary rule .. .the Court has given an entirely different
character to the rights of the individual against unreasonable searches and
seizures under the Fourteenth Amendment from that to his rights under the
Fourth. . . . [Ilf the 'federal rule' [of exclusion] be rejected in state cases, what,
if anything, has the Court substituted in its place to give reality to the federal
right?
10. E.g., "[T]he application of the Fourth Amendment and the extent to which the
essential right of privacy is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment are of course not restricted within .. .historic bounds." 359 U.S. at
365-66.
11. Each case dealing with the problem compounds the ambiguity by citing Wolf's
inconclusive statement of principle. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132
(1954); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 119 (1951).
In Stefanelli v. Minard, supra at 122, the Court apparently reasoned that a "mere"
conviction on evidence illegally seized pursuant to an unreasonable search by state
officers would not violate due process unless it threatened "irreparable injury, clear
and imminent." Apparently then, any "'injury" less severe than that will not be a
violation of due process requiring exclusion of evidence unless it "shocks the conscience." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). Yet Mr. Justice Jackson,
speaking for the Court in Irvine v. California, supra at 134, said: "Never, until June
of 1949 did this court hold the basic search-and-seizure prohibition in any way applicable to the states. . . .We adhere to Wolf . . . and decline to introduce vague
and subjective distinctions." (Emphasis added.) This is probably the most explicit
statement in which the Court has recognized any substantial identity between the
protections involved in the fourth and fourteenth amendments. But if the protections
of the fourth amendment are "in any way" applicable to the states, it may be that
in some unspecified ways those protections are less extensive and that state searches
may safely be somewhat more unreasonablethan the unreasonable searches conducted
by federal officers.
12. The manner in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter traced the historical origins of
the fourth amendment in Frank seemed to indicate a concern with the substantive
protections of that amendment:
Application of the broad restraints of due process compels inquiry into the nature
of the demand being made upon individual freedom in a particular context ...
The history of the constitutional protection against official invasion of the
citizen's home makes explicit the human concerns which it was meant to respct.
... . [V]ivid memory . . .of . . .abuses produced the Fourth Amendment.
359 U.S. at 363.
[Tiwo protections emerge from the broad constitutional proscriptions of official
invasion . . .the right to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy .. .
[and] the right to resist unauthorized entry which has as its design the securing
of information to fortify the coercive power of the state. . . .Thus, evidence of
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(2) the due process clause only requires state officers to respect the
fundamental safeguards which are essential to the American concept
of a free society, and though the precedents of the fourth amendment may be relevant to a determination of what is essential, the
power of search enforced in Frank violates none of those "fundamental" safeguards. 13 By using language open to such cariant interpretation, the Court has expanded its freedom to deal, case-by-case,
with the particular facts of an alleged "unreasonable search,"' 4 for
it need no longer restrict itself to an evaluation of that which is "of
the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," 15 but may also
draw heavily on the precedents of the fourth amendment.
However, it is safe to assume that the Justices of the United States
Supreme Court, in expanding the scope of their discretionary evaluation of the facts, have not ignored their traditional responsibility
for delineating the proper spheres of state and federal authority. 6
If the Court had been proceeding ad hoc, basing decisions solely on
a discretionary weighing of the facts, it would have needed no more
than honorific citations to Wolf; but the Justices' repeated citation
of the strong statement in that case of the principles of the fourth
amendment, in the context of decisions which did not fully effectuate
those principles,' 7 belies such a discretionary approach. Therefore,
Frank should probably be regarded as another in a series of cases
in which the Court's majority was made up of Justices whose inclination toward an "incorporation"' s approach, or perhaps, more excriminal action may not, save in very limited and closely confined situations, be
seized without a judicially issued search warrant.
Id. at 365.
13. "[TIhe inspection touch[es] at most upon the periphery of the important
interests safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against official imatrusion .. " Id. at 367. (Emphasis added.) "[Bly reason of its intrinsic elements, its
historic sanctions, and its safeguards, the Maryland proceedings . . . [do] not offend
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 373.
14. Thus, Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the majority in Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128, 133 (1954), distinguished Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952):
"However obnoxious are the facts in the case before us, they do not involve coercion,
violence, or brutality to the person, but rather a trespass to property plus eavesdropping."
15. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
16. Compare Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), and Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
243 (1833), with Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932), and Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
17. See note 11 supra. In Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951), the Court
upheld a federal district court dismissal of a suit in equity brought to compel a state
criminal court to suppress evidence obtained by state officers by means of an allegedly illegal search. In Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), the Court refused to
set aside a state conviction based on evidence obtained by means which the Court,
in refusing, said "flagrantly, deliberately, and persistently violated the fundamental
principle declared by the Fourth Amendment .... Id. at 132. See also Allen, supra
note 9.
18. Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947),
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tensive supervision of state enforcement procedure under the due
process clause, 19 is tempered by a desire to avoid interfering with
e political processes by which freedom is best maintained." The
following discussion is predicated on the assumption that the statement in Wolf, that "were a State affirmatively to sanction such police
incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the
Fourteenth Amendment," 21 means that a state may not, by legislative enactment, create a power of "unreasonable search in the
sense in which that term is used in the fourth amendment. If that
assumption is correct, it would seem to be inconsequential whether
rovides the most complete statement of the "incorporation" approach: "I would
llow what I believe was the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment-to
extend to all the people of the nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights."
19. "The conviction has steadily grown that, in protecting and vindicating basic
individual freedoms and immunities . . . the Court may justifiably abandon many
of the self-imposed limitations on judicial power generally recognized in other types
of constitutional adjudication." Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism,
and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1, 9 (1950). Allen cited Ex parte Endo, 323
U.S. 283, 299-300 (1944), and Prince v. Massachusetts, 821 U.S. 158, 173 (1944)
(Murphy, J., dissenting) as well as Mr. Justice Stone's suggestion in United States
v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), that 'there may be narrower
scope for the operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears
on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the
first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced
within the Fourteenth." Allen, supra at 9.
, 20. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has consistently tried to steer somewhere between
supervision" of the states and pre-emption of the effective political processes, which
he regards as the ultimate guardian of liberty. See his opinion in Wolf v. Colorado,
388 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1949): "The public opinion of a community can far more effectively be exerted against oppressive conduct on the part of police directly responsible
to the community itself than can local opinion, sporadically aroused, be brought to
bear upon remote authority pervasively exerted throughout the country." And in
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599 (1940), he said: 'Except where
the transgression of constitutional liberty is too plain for argument, personal freedom
is best maintained- so long as the remedial channels of the democratic process
remain open and unobstructed -when its is ingrained in people's habits and not
enforced against popular policy by the coercion of adjudicated law."
ATms arcA SysT.Em OF Cov-nN~mENT
See JACKsON, TAE SuPREmE CoURT In T
80, 81 (1955).
I know of no modem instance in which any judiciary has saved a whole people
from the great currents of intolerance, passion, usurpation, and tyranny which have
threatened liberty and free institutions ...
It is not idle speculation to inquire which comes first, either in time or importance, an independent and enlightened judiciary or a free and tolerant society.
...
[I]t is my belief that the attitude of a society and of its organized political
forces, rather than its legal machinery, is the controlling force in the character
of free institutions.
Ricrs 73 (1950):
See also CoMMAGER, MAjomrrY Rur.E AND MrNonR
The tendency to decide issues of personal liberty in the judicial arena alone has
the effect of lulling the people into apathy towards issues that are fundamentally
their concern, with the comforting notion that the courts will take care of personal and minority rights. It effectively removes these issues from the arena of
public discussion and thus deprives democracy of the inestimable benefit of
experimentation.
21. 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
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its correctness results from incorporation of the protections of the
fourth amendment into the fourteenth or from the prohibitions
which fundamental principles of justice interpose against any
"affirmative incursion into privacy."2 2
Although some health inspectors may infrequently assist in crim-

inal investigations, 2 3 the usual scope of their inspections may be
appropriately designated "civil." 24 Such "civil" searches might prop22. Wolf v. Colorado, 838 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). But if Frank is based on an
"incorporation" approach-defining the concept of "unreasonable search" under the
fourth amendment-it does make at least one important difference: the distinction
between "civil" and "criminal" searches, as Frank stated it, must then be treated as
a limitation on the constitutional protection against searches by federal officials.
23. On two or three occasions, the inspectors of the Minneapolis Health Department have provided the morals squad of the municipal police department with
information about narcotics violations observed in the course of routine inspections.
However, the police have not solicited such information, and the normal course of
the Health Department's inspection procedure is directed only to the discovery of
health nuisances. The director of the Housing Inspection Division emphasized that a
health inspection system will probably be more effective where the inspectors concern
themselves only with violations of the health ordinances. Interview With Director of
Housing Inspection, Minneapolis Health Department in Minneapolis, Sept. 24, 1959.
Similarly, the housing inspectors of the St. Paul, Minn., Health Department have
had little to do with procuring criminal evidence. Although they were recently requested by the police of that city to "keep their eyes on" a particular private club
and to report evidence of violations of liquor laws, that was the only such request
ithin the memory of the present inspectors. Interview With Health Sanitarian, St.
Paul Health Department, in St. Paul, Oct. 16, 1959.
On the other hand, use of health inspections as a means for obtaining evidence of
crime may be encouraged by the decision in Frank. The Baltimore police did not wait
long to try that device: in State v. Pettiford, Baltimore Superior Bench, December,
1959, summarized in 28 U.S.L. WEEx 2286 (Dec. 22, 1959), a police officer, assigned
to the sanitation division, bad utilized the power of entry granted by the Baltimore
health ordinance (apparently City Code, art. 12, § 120; see note 3 supra) to gain
entry to a house, observe an illegal lotter, and then signal a waiting vice-squad officer. The court ruled that Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 22, required that the evidence
be excluded, for the "exception" to Wolf created by Frank "is not to be used to cover
searches without warrants inconsistent with conceptions of human rights embodied in
our State and Federal Constitutions."
Thus, convictions obtained as a result of these novel "searches" for criminal evidence may not stand in the face of proof of collaboration between police and health
inspectors, at least where conviction is by a federal court. Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914). But even where the exclusionary rule is in effect, obtaining
proof of collaboration would probably be difficult, for it is likely that most police
techniques utilizing this new approach will be more sophisticated than the feeble
attempt made by the Baltimore police.
24. Under the BALTmioRE, MD., Crry CODE, art. 12, § 119 (1950), any person who
fails to obey an order of the Commissioner of Health to remedy unsatisfactory conditions found on a first inspection is guilty of a misdemeanor. The court in Frank reasoned that the purpose of the inspection is "civil" because it is "merely to ascertain
the existence of evils to be corrected upon due notification, or, in default of such
correction, to be made the basis of punishment." 859 U.S. at 362.
It is not clear whether the search is denominated "civil" because of the nature of
the subject-matter of the ordinance which the inspection enforces or because of the
fact that the penalties are inoperative until the defendant has failed to comply with
the order. If the latter is the determinative factor, it would seem that a different
result is called for where the ordinance provides for an immediate penalty for the
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erly have been read out of the protections of the fourth amendment
if the historical context in which those protections developed had
25
been limited to criminal cases such as Entick v. Carrington.
But
the FrankCourt cited Entick, an important constitutional precedent,
in support of its holding that the fourth amendment applies only to
searches for criminal evidence,26 without attempting to reconcile
important aspects of the historical development of that provision
maintenance of certain prohibited conditions. Similarly, inspections to ascertain
com liance with an order to correct conditions discovered on an earlier inspection
would seem to fall outside of the "civil" category, for their only purpose is to provide
evidence for invoking criminal sanctions. A recent Note on the problems of urban
renewal indicates that these may be more than academic propositions. In discussing
the desirability of having the city counsel attend "team" inspections by members of
various city departments, it states that "the presence of a lawyer tends to assure
that adequate evidence will be gathered to support a prosecution, and affords the
prosecuting attorney a greater familiarity with the case." Note, Urban Renewal:
Problems of Eliminating and Preventing Urban Deterioration,72 HIAv.L. REV. 504,
546 (1959).
On the other band, it may be the subject-matter of the ordinance enforced by
search which determines whether that search is "civil" or "criminal." But from the
viewpoint of the person whose privacy is intruded upon, "reasonableness" must depend upon the particular manner of search and the harshness of the sanction which
may be enforced by search.
In the latter regard, see the discussion of State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio St.
123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958), prob. juris. noted, 360 U.S. 246 (1959), note 58 infra.
25. 19 Howell's State Trials, col. 1029 (Ct. C.P. 1765). Enticlk held that the
British Secretary of State had no power to issue general warrants for search and
seizure upon mere suspicion of criminal (seditious) libel, and allowed the victim of
a search to recover in trespass.
26. 359 U.S. at 363, 364, 365. Although the Court never expressed that precise
holding, it is difficult to draw any other conclusion from the language it used. After
specifically noting that the interest protected by the fourth amendment is the privacy
of the individual, the Court proceeded to find that interest to be without protection
because the search involved was not a search for criminal evidence. Id. at 365. In
view of the Court's emphasis upon the qualitative difference between "civil" and
"criminal" searches, there can be little consolation in its statement that the application
of the fourth amendment is "of course not restricted within these historic bounds."
Id. at 366. And the fact that the ordinance limits the inspector's power of "civil"
search is probably not a factor of great constitutional importance. See note 7 supra
and note 70 infra and accompanying text. Nevertheless, these qualificatios to the
controlling "civil" aspect of the case should not be ignored; in some future case the
Court may be inclined to rely on them to qualify the force of the apparent holding
of the instant case. It has been suggested that State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio
St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958), prob. juris. noted, 360 U.S. 246 (1959), discussed at note 58 infra, may test the significance of the limitations which an ordinance imposes on an inspector's power because the inspection ordinance involved in
that case, DAYToN, Omo, CoDE § 806-30 (1959), does not require that the inspector
have "cause." See 108 U. PA. L. REv. 265, 278 n.77 (1959). On the other hand, it
may be argued that there is no substantial difference between the two provisions,
since the Baltimore ordinance, note 3 supra, leaves the determination of probable
cause to the discretion of the inspector. If the argument at note 70 infra andaccompanying text is accepted, then the Dayton ordinance appears to require adherence to
substantially the same types of restrictions that the Baltimore ordinance imposed:
inspection must be conducted in the daytime and (by judicial construction) may not
be effectuated by forcible entry.
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which would have supported an opposite conclusion.27
Long before the dispute in Entick focused attention on the broad
powers of search for criminal evidence granted by "general warrants,"2 unrestricted powers of "civil" 2 9 search, exercised by customs
officers 30 and local officials of organized trades, 31 were publicly con27. For a thorough historical treatment of the development of the fourth amendment, see Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, JoHNs HoPxNs UNrvEsrrY SrimEs IN HrsToRicAL AND
PoLrricAL ScsarcE,

Series 55, No. 2 (1937).

28. These powers, early adopted by the Privy Council and the Court of Star
Chamber to suppress non-conformism and sedition, were granted the king by the
Licensing Act, 14 (13 & 14) Car. 2, c. 33 § 15 (1662), for the same purposes. Upon
expiration of that act, the Secretary of State continued to claim the power to issue
general warrants; and the exercise of that power, resulting in the imprisonment of
John Wilkes, member of parliament and author of the incendiary pamphlet North
Briton, led to the series of opinions by Chief Justice Pratt of the Court of Common
Pleas which culminated in Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials, col 1029
(Ct. C.P. 1765). Lasson, supra note 27, at 24-48.
Typically, these warrants were general as to grounds for suspicion, person suspected,
place to be searched, and thing to be seized. Some of these objectionable features
may be implied from the modifications recommended by Lord Hale's treatise:
The moderation and temperments that are to be added to these warrants, are
these:
1. They are not to be granted without oath made before the justice of a felony
committed, and that the party complaining hath probable cause to suspect they
are in such a house or place, and do show his reasons for such suspicion.
And therefore I do take it, that a general warrant to search all suspected places
is not good, but only to search in particular places ...

2

HALE, TnE HisToRy OF THE PLEAS OF

=

CROWN

149r-150 (1847).

29. Compared to the notoriously severe criminal penalties of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, which emphasized corporal punishment, the provisions for
forfeiture of goods, vessels, and sums of money up to one hundred pounds were "civil"
penalties. See HooPER, THE HToRY OF NEwGATE AND T=E OLD BAILEY, ch. 5 (1935).
And those penalties were not different in substance than the penalties which could
have been invoked by authority of the statute in Frank for non-compliance with orders
demanding remedy of health nuisances. See, e.g., Cider Tax, 3 Geo. 3, c. 12 (1762)
(forfeitures from ten to twenty pounds or value of goods with their casks); Excise
Tax, 1 Anne Stat. 2, c. 3 (1702) (forfeitures from ten to fifty pounds or double the
value of the duty owed); Hearth Money Tax, 16 Car. 2, c. 3 (1664) (value of hearth
money tax to be satisfied by distress and sale of goods); An Act to Prevent Frauds
and Abuses In The Custom, 14 (13 & 14) Car. 2, c. 11 (1662) (forfeitures from five
to one hundred pounds; forfeiture of goods and boat-allowed to expire); Excise
Tax, 12 Car. 2, c. 33 (1660) (forfeitures from five pounds to double the value of the
goods sold without clearing excise); Excise Tax, 12 Car. 2, c. 4 (1660) (forfeiture
of uncustomed goods).
30. General powers of search were resisted by the people when granted to customs
officers for collection of the Cider Tax, 3 Geo. 3, c. 12 (1762) (contemporaneous with
the unrest over the arrest of John Wilkes- see note 28 supra); the Hearth Money
Tax, 14 Car. 2, c. 10 (1662); the Excise Tax, 12 Car. 2, c. 23 (1660); and the duty
of Tonnage and Poundage, 1 Jac. 1, c. 33 (1640). The defeat of an Excise Scheme
for taxing wines as they were withdrawn from warehouses for home consumption,
proposed by Walpole in 1733, must be attributed in part to popular opposition to the
investigation and search provisions of the bill. And the generally unpopular Writs of
Assistance, which commanded all persons to "assist' in their execution, were adopted
as part of An Act to Prevent Frauds and Abuses In The Custom, 14 (13 & 14) Car. 2,
c. 11 (1662). Lasson, supra note 27, at 34, 37-38, 40-41.
31. Henry VI, and later, Parliament and the Court of Star Chamber gave "general
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demned and resisted. In the colonies, the despised writs of assistance
were an important catalyst for revolution.3 2 These writs were em-

ployed almost exclusively in sporadic and generally unsuccessful
attempts to enforce customs regulations carrying civil penalties no
different from those imposed upon an English violator. 33 Otis' heated
searching powers to certain organized trades in the enforcement of their sundry
regulations." Lasson cites 39 Eliz., c. 13 (1597) and 11 Hen. 7, c. 27 (1495) as
examples of acts of Parliament granting such powers. See Lasson, supra note 27, at 24.
32. The first generally known statute to include provision for "Writs of Assistance"
was An Act to Prevent Frauds and Abuses In The Custom, 14 (13 & 14) Car. 3, c. 11,
§§ 5, 30 (1662) which provided for a non-returnable order requiring public officers
to assist the officers of the customs in gaining entry to unspecified places and conducting searches for unspecified, uncustomed goods. A subsequent re-enactment in
1696, 7 & 8 Win. 3, c. 22, § 6, gave the officers of the customs in the colonies "the
same powers and authorities" that they had in England. Disputation over the validity
of the issuance of these writs by colonial courts, which culminated in Paxtor's Case,
QrINcY's MASSAcnus'rrs REPoRTs, 1761-1772, at 469-77 (1865), was set to rest by
the Townshend Act in 1767. But vocal and physical resistance to the broad powers
of inspection and search which they granted dated from Paxton's Case. Lasson, supra
note 27, at 53-58, 71.
33. Until commencement of the Seven Year's War, the duties on sugar, molasses
and rum imported from the French Indies had been left largely unenforced. Lasson,
supra note 27, at 52. After the commencement of the war with France, the British
sought to discourage that trade by demanding enforcement of various restrictive
duties, primarily the Sugar Acts, 6 Geo. 2, c. 13 (1732); 4 Geo. 3, c. 15 (1763). But
attempts at enforcement were substantially defeated by resistance in the colonies,
much of which sprang from the exercise of inquisitorial powers by the customs officers. Judgments of forfeiture were infrequent in the common-law courts. McCLWAN,
SmuGGLrn IN iE CoLo rms 60 (1912). And even when a judgment of forfeiture
might issue from a vice-admiralty court, the customs officers were discouraged from
performing their duties by the willingness of the common-law juries to render verdicts
in trespass against customs officers who utilized their power of entry. BEEa~, Bnmus
COLONIAL Poracy, 1754-1765, at 120 (1907). The vice-admiralty courts, on which
the crown relied to enforce the acts, were also amenable to the local temperament:
"[D]efects were revealed in the system of vice-admiralty courts. Some of these courts
were strongly influenced by local feeling and refused to condemn vessels for trading
with the enemy." BEm, op. cit. supra at 126.
The typical penalties which the crown sought to enforce for violation of the customs laws are illustrated by those provided for in the Sugar Acts supra. The Act of
1732 provided for forfeiture of goods landed without registration for payment of
duty. Anyone found to have assisted the smuggler by transporting goods or receiving
them for storage was to forfeit three times the value of the goods transported or
received; and the master of the transporting ship was subject to a forfeiture of u
to one hundred pounds. In addition, a provision similar to the ordinance in Fran
required that for resistance to the customs collector, there should be a forfeiture of
up to fifty pounds. The Sugar Bill of 1763, 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, made the customs regulations somewhat more stringent (e.g., master required to give bond when transporting
goods between colonial ports) and added to the list of forfeitures: (1) the vessel in
which contraband goods were transported; (2) a monetary forfeiture of three times
the value of any unreported, concealed goods found aboard ship after filing of the
customs report, to be paid by the master.
As discussed in note 29, these penalties are not in character with the criminal
penalties of that day. And although the one hundred pound forfeiture might approach a "criminal" penalty in severity if not in form, the principal penalty relied
upon was probably seizure and forfeiture, a rather ineffective sanction according to
MCCLELLAN, supra, and BEEa, supra. Not only did the courts render unlikely the
infliction of any penalty except possibly seizure and forfeiture of the contraband
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argument in Paxton's Case3 4 against the issuance of writs of assist-

ance to the collector of customs indicates that the colonists feared
arbitrary and wanton exercise of governmental authority, whether
in "criminal" or "civil' cases."' When the advocates of the Bill of

Rights argued for adoption of its constitutional safeguards, they did
not distinguish between searches for "civil" and "criminal" evidence.
Rather, they illustrated the dangers of arbitrary search with ex-

amples drawn from their own experience with the "civil" inspections
of customs officers. 6
In Frank, the Court cited Boyd v. United States' and Entick v.
38
to support the proposition that the prohibitions of the
Carrington
fourth amendment were developed as a protection against searches
for criminal evidence, and therefore have no application to civil
searches.3 9 In Boyd, the Court held that where certain severe penal-

ties imposed by customs laws "in substance" converted a civil progoods, but subsequent to the Stamp Act Biot of 1765, rescue parties rendered even
the few attempted seizures unsuccessful. See Lasson, supra note 27, at 68. Even if
the forfeitures had been criminal penalties in form, the "law in action" was so
different from the "law on the books" that it is inconceivable that those colonists
subjected to search felt themselves threatened by criminal penalties. Thus, in both
form and substance, the circumstances which gave rise to the later demand for
constitutional protections from unreasonable search involved essentially "civil" enforcement.
34. QunNcy's MAssAcHUSmFS REPORTs, 1761-1772, at 469-77 (1865).
35. Otis illustrated with the following example the consequences of giving arbitrary powers of search to petty officials:
Mr. Justice Walley had called this same Mr. Ware before him, by a constable,
to answer for a breach of the sabbath-day acts, or that of profane swearing. As
soon as he had finished, Mr. Ware asked him if he had done. He replied, Yes.
Well, then, said Mr. Ware, I will show you a little of my power. I command
you to permit me to search your house for uncustomed goods; and went on to
search the house from the garret to the cellar; and then served the constable
in the same manner
Account of Otis' argument in Paxton's Case. TUDOR, LrIF oF JAmm_ OTIs 67 (1823).
Otis further explained the scope of the protection which the law should afford:
"Otis. This Writ is against the fundamental Principles of Law.- The Privilege of
House. A Man, who is quiet, is as secure in his House, as a Prince in his Castle notwithstanding a his debts, & civil processes of any Kind." Account of Otis' argument in Paxtonds Case, QuiNcY's MAssAcHuszrrs REPRTS, 1761-1772, at 471
(1865). (Emphasis added.)
36. Lasson quoted from Patrick Henry's speech to the Virginia adoptive convention: "'Excisemen may come in multitudes. . . . They may . .. search and ransack and measure everything you eat, drink, or wear."' Lasson, supra note 27, at 93.
He also noted that James Madison used the example of the revenue officer in arguing
for the adoption of the fourth amendment. Id. at 99.
37. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
38. 19 Howell's State Trials, col. 1029 (Ct. C.P. 1765).
39. 359 U.S. 365. Boyd has occasionally been cited for this proposition. See
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 466 (1932). But generally such references
are in connection with the assertion in Boyd that the provisions of the fourth amendment have no application to civil attachments for debt, seizures by customs agents,
etc. - all in a context which, as discussed in note 51 infra, may well have assumed
preliminary discretionary action by a judicial officer. See Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 151 (1925); Levy v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. 600, 38 Pac. 965 (1895).
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ceeding into a criminal case, a court order compelling production of
a document violated the fourth and fifth amendments. Proceeding
on a questionable theory of interrelationship between the two
amendments, 40 the Boyd Court held that the fourth amendment was
violated because the production order was the "equivalent" of an
unreasonable search, since it required the accused to give evidence
against himself in a criminal case.4 ' In Frank, Mr. Justice Frankfurther reasoned that Boyd merely applied the rationale of Entick
in holding that the fifth amendment (applicable only to criminal
cases 42 ) "throws light" on the types of searches prohibited by the
fourth amendment.4 Since Entick and Boyd explained the rationale
of the protections incorporated in the fourth amendment in the context of a "criminal" case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter concluded that the
fourth amendment must apply only to criminal cases.44
The rationale of Entick, revealed in the lines quoted by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter,45 does not compel his conclusion that the protections
40. Many subsequent decisions have ignored the interrelationship. In Wilson v.
United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911), where a subpoena duces tecum required
production of evidence by the officers of a corporation in a criminal proceeding
grand jury) against them, the Court ignored the "light" which the fifth amendment
throws on the fourth, and held that such compelled production of incriminating
evidence was not an "unreasonable search and seizure." Cf. Davis v. United States,
328 U.S. 582 (1946).
To the extent that the purpose of the fifth amendment's prohibition of testimonial
compulsion is to discourage reliance upon 'less dependable admissions . . . obtained as a result of compulsory interrogation" and thereby "stimulate the police
and prosecutor into a search for the most dependable evidence procurable by their
own exertions," INBAU, SELF-INCRIMINATON 7 (1950), the fourth amendment, by

protecting privacy from the "exertions"' of police and prosecutor, at the cost of "the
most dependable evidence," would seem to conflict with the ffth.
41. The concept of "constructive" search and seizure, which originated with Boyd
v. United States, relied upon the theory that an order to produce evidence (usually
documentary) was the "equivalent" of an actual search and seizure. In FTC v.
American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924), the Court avoided the question of the
constitutionality of the subpoena duces tecum, but noted that it could not have
been the intent of Congress under § 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to
authorize the use of the subpoena power except where limited to reasonable
demands for papers of shown materiality. The reliance of the dissent in Frank, at
359 U.S. 375-76, upon the strong implications of American Tobacco ignores Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946), the effect of which is
firmly stated by Professor Davis to be that "objections under the Fourth Amendment
to a subpoena duces tecum are answered by the simple observation that such a
subpoena involves 'no question of actual search and seizure."' 1 DAvis, AnNqLsraRTrVE LAw TasErnsF § 3.05, at 181 (1958).
42. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. (Emphasis added.)
43. 359 U.S. at 364-65. Although the opinion purports to find it unnecessary "to
accept any particular theory of the interrelationship of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments

. .

.", it nevertheless adopts the language of Boyd, which expresses that

interrelationship, as illustrative of a "background" from which "emerges" a constitutional protection limited in scope to searches for criminal evidence. Id. at 365.
44. Ibid.
45. Id. at 364-65.
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of the fourth amendment apply only to searches for criminal
evidence:
the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; because the necessary means
of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the
guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it should seem, that search
for evidence is disallowed upon the same46principle. There too the innocent would be confounded with the guilty.

A neutral and more reasoilable interpretation of these lines is that
the relationship between the constitutional prohibitions of the fourth
and fifth amendments may be found in the fact that arbitrary conduct by government officers may result in coerced self-incrimination
or invasion of privacy, consequences which may fall equally on both
the innocent and the guilty. But since the relationship is limited to
the fact that both innocent and guilty may share those consequences,47 the Court in Frank would have been free to conclude that the
interest protected by the privilege against self-incrimination is freedom from testimonial compulsion, 4 while the interest protected by

the privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures is the privacy

of the home4 9 -whether "civil" or "criminal" evidence be the object

46. 19 Howells State Trials, col. 1029, 1073 (1765).
47. When Chief Justice Pratt said that "the innocent would be confounded with
the guilty" (emphasis added), he was not particularly concerned with the possibility
that the innocent may ultimately be found guilty as a result of the "evidence"
extracted, but rather with the probability that innocent persons may be made to
suffer the consequences of the "necessary means of compelling self-accusation" and
search of private homes, i.e., arbitrary action by government officers. See MmuurxW-srum's NEw INTmNATioNAL DICnoNARY 561 (2d ed. 1947): con-found'
1. Archaic. a To bring to ruin or naught . . . discomfit ..
"
48. "Ilt is the employment of the legal process to extract from the person's own
lips an admission of his guilt .....
4 WiGmoRE, EVmENCE § 2263, at 863 (2d ed.
1923).
49. The statement that the fourth amendment protects the privacy of the home
has been made in some form in virtually every important search and seizure case.
See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948); Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925).
Some writers have contended that the ultimate interest protected by the prohibitions of both the fourth and the fifth amendments is personal privacy. See Atkinson,
Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures,
25 CoLum. L. BREv. 11, 17 (1925): "[B]oth are based upon the idea that the government's authority to infringe upon personal privacy should be limited. . . . The
[fourth amendment] is ostensibly to protect physical privacy; and the [fifth amendment] the privacy of one's knowledge." But even Atldnson, in setting forth this
relationship between the amendments, recognized that unreasonable search may
involve an invasion of privacy more difficult to control than compelled self-incrimination; and the basis of that recognition admits of no distinction between "civil"
and "criminal" searches:
The Fourth Amendment is generally a limitation upon enforcement officers, and
the privilege against self-incrimination is a limitation upon prosecutors and trial
ourts..

. . [Ulnreasonable

search presents a much stronger case for the

exclusion of evidence [because] . . . the search cannot be so effectively restrained, for it is ordinarily conducted by petty, free-lance officials, away from
the eye of the court.
Id. at 17.
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of search.50 The fact that the prohibited evils of invasion of privacy
and testimonial compulsion may, as in Boyd, be compounded by
compelled production of documents should not obscure the fact
that both Boyd and Entick tend, if anything, to support the view
that the fourth amendment requires a warrant for both "criminal"

and "civil" searches. Both cases suggest that even where the state
has a strong interest in utilizing a power of search, and where search
is only conducted pursuant to a judicially issued warrant, the reasonableness of that search will nevertheless be subjected to close constitutional scrutiny. 51 That approach has been so embodied in our
50. Logical support for Mr. Justice Frankfurter's reasoning might be found in the
fact that in Boyd it would have been unnecessary for the court to find "the substance" of a criminal proceeding if search and seizure in a civil proceeding was
unconstitutional. This theory ignores the basic weakness of the holding that the
compelled production of documents constitutes a "search" within the meaning of
the fourth amendment, discussed in note 41 supra. In order to bolster its holding
that the compelled production of documents was compelled self-incrimination within
the meaning of the fifth amendment, it was necessary for the Court to argue that
arbitrary search and seizure was among the forms of self-incrimination prohibited.
Similarly, the Court bolstered its holding that compelled production of documents
,was the "equivalent" of an unreasonable search by relying on the "unreasonableness"
of compelled self-incrimination inherent in the order to produce documents. And
for the prohibition against self-incrimination to be applicable, it was necessary to
determine that the civil proceeding was in substance a criminal case." See Atkinson, supra note 49, at 15: "The holding in the prevailing opinion of the Boyd case
that the Fourth Amendment was violated, as well as the Fifth, was probably not
necessary for the decision of the case."
51. Entick actually went much further, for dictum in that case emphasized that
the basis on which the court denied the power of search granted by general warrants was, that with the exception of searches for stolen goods, the law forbade all
searches as unreasonable, regardless of limitations or checks which might be imposed
upon them:
The case of searching for stolen goods crept into the law by imperceptible
practice ...
Observe too the caution with which the law proceeds in this singular case...
If it should be said that the same law which has with so much circumspection guarded the case of stolen goods from mischief, would likewise in this case
protect the subject, by adding proper checks . . . my answer is, that all these
precautions would have been long since established by law, if the power itself
had been legal; and that the want of them is an undeniable argument against
the legality of the thing.
19 Howell's State Trials at col. 1067 (1865).
Entick's approach was modified in the United States to allow search on the
authority of a properly issued warrant in cases where a great public interest was
at stake. See Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841); Sandford v.
Nichols, 13 Mass. 285 (1816); Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. R. 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1813). And in Robinson v. Richardson, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 454, 457 (1859), the
court said of searches pursuant to warrant:
Even in those cases, if we may rely on the authority of Lord Coke, their legality
was formerly doubted . . . . But their legality has long been considered to be
established on the ground of public necessity, because without them felons and
other malefactors would escape detection. . . . [Tlhe adoption of the 14th
Article of the Declaration of Rights [state prohibition of unreasonable searches]
. . . was . . . certainly not [intended] so to vary, extend, and enlarge the
purposes for and occasions on which they might be used, or to make them
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law that until the instant case, it would have been difficult to imagine a civil case so important that intrusion upon privacy, without
warrant, could withstand the test of reasonableness. 2 The dissenters
in Frank perceptively pinpointed the essence of the traditional
approach by observing that while estimates of the reasonableness of
particular kinds of searches may differ, depending upon the objective of the search-for example, evidence of narcotics violation,
murder, subversion, fire hazards -"the public interest in protecting
privacy is equally as great in one case as in another."
The United States Supreme Court and the high courts of the
several states have recognized each state's special responsibility for
protecting the health of its citizens. 4 These courts have consistently
legal and available in the course, or for the maintenance of [private] civil
proceedings.
Thus, the question in each case was not whether there could be search without a
warrant, but rather, whether even with a judicially issued warrant, a particular
power of search was unreasonable and constitutionally prohibited.
These questions became particularly difficult where the courts dealt, under the
revenue laws, with orders to produce documents or with powers of search, because
the courts recognized the strong national interest in an efficient investigative procedure. Stockwell v. United States, 28 Fed. Cas. 116 (No. 13,466) (D. Me. 1870),
was the leading case cited by Boyd, at 635, 686. There it was urged that the
power to authorize warrants was limited to criminal cases, and it is apparent that
the Court, in an action for debt for recovery of duties and penalties, felt compelled
to find a "criminal" element in the action before it could justify a search pursuant to
a warrant.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), involved the same question. There
too, the "search" involved in the order to produce documents was subjected to a
constitutional test despite the fact that the order, the "equivalent" of the warrant in
cases of actual search, was only to be issued at the judge's "discretion." AcT To
Ai.m-D Tim CustoMs REVEuE LAws, AND To REEAL MomETs, § 5, 18 Stat. 186
(1874), cited in Boyd v. United States, supra, at 619-20. It is clear that that limitation required the test of "probable cause" to be met. See 2 CONG. REc. 4681-82 &
4817 (1874) (remarks of Senators Wright and Conlding).
52. A few of the "revenue cases" before Boyd relied on the fact that actions
enforcing customs regulations were "civil" and that search in such cases was not
"unreasonable." But these cases, too, arose where a judicial warrant had been issued;
only in that context was the "reasonableness" of the search determined by its civil
purpose. See In re Platt, 19 Fed. Cas. 815 (No. 11, 212) (S.D.N.Y. 1874), and In re
Meador, 16 Fed. Cas. 1294 (No. 9, 875) (D.C.N.D. Ga. 1869).
A search warrant was also found to be reasonable because it was for a "civil"
rather than for a "criminal" search, in Camden County Beverage Co. v. Blair, 46
F.2d 648 (D.N.J. 1930). But most of the authority cited in support of that holding, when read in context, emphasized the use of warrants in criminal cases as
a means of showing the reasonableness of the particular search. And two of the
cases, People v. Kempner, 208 N.Y. 16, 101 N.E. 794 (1913), and Newberry v.
Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567, 65 N.W. 530 (1895), reject the propriety of issuing
search warrants where the warrants may interfere with the rights of the parties in
civil actions.
53. 859 U.S. at 382.
54. California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 806 (1905);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U.S. 217
(1889); Nelson v. City of Minneapolis, 112 Minn. 16, 127 N.W. 445 (1910); accord,
Queenside Hills Co. v. Saxl, 828 U.S. 80 (1946); St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v.
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expanded the scope of constitutionally reasonable 55 or necessary

6

exercises of police powers in response to new developments in medical knowledge or techniques. 57 However, in only a few reported

cases has the power of inspection without warrant come into open
conflict with an individual's right to privacy.58 This fact seems to
Illinois, 185 U.S. 203 (1902). Cf. District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 188
(1909); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S.
501 (1878); Hurst v. Warner, 102 Mich. 238, 60 N.W. 440 (1894). See Annot. 47
Am. St. Rep. 544 (1894). See generally, HEMENWAY, LEGAL PRhNcipLES OF PoBLIC
HEALTH ADmxmTRAnoN 168-83 (1914).
55. Most constitutional challenges to public health ordinances have been directed
at protection of property interests. See generally, Annot., 47 Am. St. Rep. 544
(1894); HEmmNWAy, op. cit. supra note 54. If the protection against arbitrary search
and seizure is to be liberally construed, these cases affirming the broad powers of
the states in the area of public health need not be controlling. Go-Bart v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931). But see In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957);
Reynard, Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure- A Second Class Constitutional Right, 25 IND. L.J. 259 (1950).
56. Many early cases upholding broad exercises of the police power were based
on the law of "necessity." Cf. People v. Robertson, 302 IMI.422, 432-33, 134 N.E.
815, 819 (1922). But as early as 1894, some observers were beginning to recognize
that more modem techniques of preventive medicine required less interference with
the liberty of the individual: "These personal rights of liberty and property suffer less
from encroachment in the quarantine laws and practice of most recent establishment,
conditioned upon the enlightened views of sanitary science and experience ....
PRENTCE, PoucE PowEas AmisNG UNm)n THE LAw OF OvERRULING NECEssrTY
114-15 (1894).
57. Delegation of broad regulatory powers to local health boards: Lieberman v.
Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552 (1905); City of Cedar Rapids v. Holcomb, 68 Iowa 107,
26 N.W. 33 (1885); Board of Health v. Heister, 37 N.Y. 661, 6 Trans. App. 170
(1868); State ex rel. Nowotny v. City of Milwaukee, 140 Wis. 38, 121 N.W. 658
(1909). But see People v. Board of Educ., 234 Il1. 422, 84 N.E. 1046 (1908); Gregory
v. City of New York, 40 N.Y. 273 (1869). But of. Hurst v. Warner, 102 Mich. 239,
60 N.W. 440 (1894).
Delegation of special powers during attacks of dangerous communicable diseases:
People v. Robertson, 302 IlM. 422, 134 N.E. 815 (1922); Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind.
121, 56 N.E. 89 (1900). But. of. Hurst v. Warner, 102 Mich. 239, 60 N.W. 440
(1894).
"Taking" of private property: Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Nelson v.
City of Minneapolis, 112 Minn. 16, 127 N.W. 445 (1910).
Interference with contract rights: Guillotte v. City of New Orleans, 12 La.
432 (1857).
Interference with other property interests: Queenside Hills Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S.
80 (1946); California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306
(1905); St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U.S. 203 (1902); Patterson v.
Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501 (1878); City of Salem v. Eastern R.R., 98 Mass. 431, 96
Am. Dec. 650 (1868).
Deprivation of (state) constitutionally protected rights to public-supported education: Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 56 N.E. 89 (1900); of. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S.
174 (1922).
Compelled submission to quarantine: People v. Robertson, 302 II. 422, 184 N.E.
815 (1922).
Compelled submission to vaccination: Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1904); of. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
58. Health officer's powers of inspection were held not to be illegal powers of
search in two early cases, distinguishable from Frank on their facts: Hubbell v.
Higgins, 148 Iowa 36, 126 N.W. 914 (1910) (inspection of hotel for compliance with
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support Mr. Justice Frankfurter's assertion in Frank that, after being

acceptance, these powers of inspection are '"ardly to be deemed to
violate due process: " ' But the early inspection practices cited in
support of that reasoning are only of slight relevance, since they
dealt primarily with problems arising outside the privacy of the
sanitary and fire regulations); Commonwealth v. Carter, 132 Mass. 12 (1882) (inspection of milk-delivery wagon). Both cases involved inspections of commercial
operations holding out services to the public, a fact that must limit their authority,
in view of the frequent holding that licensing of commercial establishments may be
conditioned on granting a right of inspection. Safee v. City of Buffalo, 204 App. Div.
561, 198 N.Y.S. 646 (1923). Cf. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946); State
v. Nelson, 66 Minn. 166, 68 N.W. 1066 (1896); Pasco v. State, 195 Wis. 348, 218

N.W. 365 (1928).
Four other recent cases have dealt with substantially the same issues raised by
Frank:
(1) Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956), affirmed a conviction
and $50.00 fine for refusing entry to a team of inspectors including representatives
from the Commissioner of Health, the Building Inspection Engineer, and the Chief
Engineer of the Fire Department, despite defendant's contention that the powers of
entry asserted were repugnant to article twenty-six of the Maryland Declaration of
Eights and the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The
court held that these protections were intended to apply only to searches for evidence
of crime.
(2) District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other
grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950), reversed a municipal court conviction for "interference"
with a health inspection of defendant's home, and held that the protection against
unreasonable searches precluded health officials from inspecting a private home
without a warrant; the United States Supreme Court avoided the constitutional issue
and affirmed on the ground that refusing entry was not the kind of "interference
proscribed by the regulation in question.
(3) State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958),
prob. juris, noted, 360 U.S. 246 (1959), held that inspection under an ordinance
similar to the one in Frank, supra note 3, was not so unreasonable as to violate
the search and seizure provision of the state constitution, and rejected summarily defendant's claim of protection under the fourth amendment. Thus, the
question which was left unanswered when the Court affirmed Little, and was apparently answered in Frank, is now to be argued again on appeal in Eaton. The substantially heavier penalties which may be imposed under the city ordinance in question in Eaton might be some grounds for the dissenters in Frank, who cast the only
votes for noting jurisdiction over Eaton, to believe that the ruling in the Frank case
can be limited. It is also possible that they may have noted jurisdiction in Eaton in
order to maintain undiminished some of the effect of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949), by rebutting the Ohio Court's summary rejection of the defendant's claim
under the fourth amendment.
(4) The most recent case to raise the constitutional issue is St. Louis v. Claspil,
City Court of St. Louis, First Division (April 29, 1959), summarized in advance
sheets to 327 S.W.2d, Judicial Highlights, p. 2. That court dismissed a complaint
filed by a building inspector pursuant to the St. Louis, Missouri, Building Code
which provides a right of entry "at any time it is necessary in his opinion to enter
any structure or portion thereof," and held the attempted inspection "unreasonable"
because it was at night (9 p.m.), there was no urgency, and it was for the enforcement of a minor regulation.
See also Perry v. City of Birmingham, 38 Ala. App. 460, 88 So. 2d 573 (1956),
where a state statute requiring officers to obtain a warrant before searching for
evidence of violation of liquor laws was held inapplicable to the enforcement of
municipal liquor ordinances.
59. 359 U.S. at 371.
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home.6 0 More relevant to due process, and properly considered by
the Court, is the current, nationwide adoption of health inspection
programs, 61 indicating a legislative judgment that such programs
are an effective and constitutional method of meeting the health
menace inherent in large urban centers.62 Nevertheless, the type of
inspection power to be granted is a constitutional question which
the Court must determine by balancing the constitutional importance of unrestricted63 entry for health inspectors against a liberal
application of the principles of the fourth amendment. 64
60. Relatively few of the "thousands upon thousands" of inspections made by
officials of the Baltimore Health Department in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, cited by the Frank Court, 359 U.S. at 370, to support the contention that
home inspection is a "time honored procedure," were actually inspections conducted
within a private home. The inspectors were primarily concerned with removing the
dangers resulting from the overflow of organic wastes from household drainage,
cesspools, and privy-wells. See HowARD, Punuc HEALTH ADMNiSTRATION AND THE
NATuR.. HISTORY OF DISEASE IN BALmon, MARYnAND 121-22, 140-46 (1924).
Most of the early inspection statutes cited by the Frank Court are only remotely
relevant to inspection of the interior of a private home: inspections of goods stored
in ships or community warehouses and intended for public consumption, and entry
on the curtilage or open fields for laying sewers or repairing roads are comparatively
insignificant invasions of privacy.
But even if these inspection practices had been relevant, the constitutional importance to be attached to their 'long acceptance" should be tempered by Cooley's
realistic evaluation of the impact of developing social institutions on the Constitution: [A] power is frequently yielded to merely because it is claimed, and it may
be exercised for a long period in violation of the constitutional prohibition without
... CoorL-,
the mischief which the Constitution was designed to guard against.
A TREATISE oN THE CONSTrrUONAL LnVrrAnONs 71 (1st ed. 1868).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's argument based on "long acceptance" may be qualified
in yet another way if the practice of Minneapolis and St. Paul health inspectors is
typical of that in other cities. The inspectors normally make no attempt to enforce by
legal action the right of entry granted them by city ordinance. Rather, they try to
obtain the co-operation of homeowners by maintaining good public relations and
relying on persuasion or ignoring an occasional refusal of entry. Interview with
Director of Housing Inspection, Minneapolis, Minn. Health Department, in Minneapolis Sept. 24, 1959; interview with Health Sanitarian, St. Paul, Minn. Health
Department, in St. Paul Oct. 16, 1959.
61. A survey published in 1953 shows that by provision of law, regulation, or
commonly accepted practice, every state in the union has empowered local health
officers or boards of health to make sanitary investigations and inspections. U.S.
PuIuc

HEALTH SERvIcE,

STATE LAws

GovErNING

LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENTs,

table A-2, pp. 8-14 (1953). This, of course, does not mean that every city has
a paid sanitary inspector, or that the powers of all sanitary inspectors are sanctioned
by penalties for refusal of entry.
62. See generally Note, Urban Renewal: Problems of Eliminating and Preventing
Urban Deterioration,72 HAnv. L. REv. 504, 545 (1959); Note, Municipal Housing
Codes, 69 H-4mv. L. REv. 115 (1956).
63. Note 70 infra and accompanying text makes clear that the practical effect of
the holding in Frank is to give health inspectors an unrestricted right of entry,
because the only substantial restrictions must be self-imposed.
64. Starting with Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), there have been
frequent judicial admonitions that the fourth amendment is to be liberally construed. See Go-Bart v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); cf. Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). Despite an occasional lapse, Olmstead v. United
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In the balancing process, the Court in Frank should have con-

sidered the fact that upholding the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches would not disable municipalities from administering their inspection programs, but would merely require
inspectors to secure a warrant where entry is refused.65 The Court
did not attempt to support its contention that health inspections
would be "greatly hobbled" by the admittedly small number of
persons likely to invoke their constitutional privilege. 6 Rather, it

seems to have reasoned that the systematic, area-by-area inspections,
which are the best preventive measures might be rendered ineffec-

tive by the inability of inspectors to support an application for a
warrant by a showing of probable cause. It is questionable whether

failure to inspect the homes of the few persons likely to assert their
right of privacy poses much of a threat to the community.67 But
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), this admonition has been heeded. Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) significantly expanded the realm of protected privacy;
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), at least opened the question of federal
supervision of state action. The Frank case qualifies that protection with a vague
and possibly dangerous precedent which ignores Mr. Justice Brandeis' reminder that
a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which
gave it birth." Olmstead v. United States, supra at 473 (dissent).
65. See Mr. Justice Jackson's concurrence in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949), where he developed the thesis that the Court may
properly interfere more freely with state regulatory measures in enforcing the equal
protection clause than in applying the due process clause. He reasoned that invalidation of a state enactment under the former provision does not disable the state in its
attempt to regulate, but requires only that the subject of regulation be defined more
inclusively. Like the equal protection clause, the due process clause applied to this
situation would "not disable any governmental body ffom dealing with the subject
at hand." See notes 66 & 67 infra.
66. 359 U.S. at 372.
The initial reaction of the Director of Housing Inspection, Minneapolis Health
Department, to the suggestion that health inspectors should be required, where
resistance is encountered, to obtain search warrants in order to carry out their duties
was concern over the difficulty, inconvenience, and expense involved in taking time
to obtain a warrant. When asked whether such a requirement would, as a result
of that delay, pose a serious threat to community health, his reply dealt with
emergency situations which would not be within the constitutional limitation. Interview, note 60 supra.
St. Paul, Minn. health inspectors felt that such a requirement would impose no
significant burden on their inspection program. Interview, note 60 supra.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's observation that "these inspections are apparently welcomed by all but an insignificant few," 359 U.S. at 372, was borne out in substance
by the estimate of the Director of Housing Inspection, Minneapolis Health Department. He sought to emphasize the inconvenience which might result from requiring
housing inspectors to obtain warrants where entry is resisted, by predicting that the
incidence of such resistance might rise from less than 1% to as high as 10% of all
houses inspected. Interview, note 60 supra. St. Paul, Minn. health inspectors encounter no significant resistance when requesting entry, and would expect little
change if they were required to obtain a warrant upon meeting resistance. Interview,
note 60 supra.
67. The Director of Housing Inspection, Minneapolis Health Department, stated
that the "ideal" municipal inspection program would include both scheduled, repetitive, area-by-area inspections and a system for responding to specific complaints.
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even conceding the probability that inspection would be less effective, only a very serious threat to community health - a problem
scarcely discussed by the Court-could justify compromise with
the principle that the need for each intrusion must be proved by
the intruder."'
The Court also relied on the fact that the Baltimore health inspector must have cause to suspect a nuisance before demanding
entry, as an additional indication of "reasonableness."( 9 But practically speaking, the enforcement officer will determine for himself
whether a reasonable cause for invasion of privacy exists; 70 and the
But he also stated that Minneapolis is one of relatively few cities which have been
able to progress beyond the "specific complaint" stage. Interview, note 60 supra.
If this is an accurate appraisal of the present development of inspection systems,
there was even less reason for the Court to be concerned. Inspectors responding to
specific complaints should generally have enough information available to support
an application for a warrant.
Assuming that incomplete inspection does pose some substantial danger to the
community, at least two alternatives to the strict requirement of probable cause are
suggested by the dissent in Frank as a possible means of resolving the conflict between public health and privacy, while still preserving the restraining check of the
judiciary on the arbitrary exercise of authority by government officers: (1) It may
be possible to provide that for the purpose of regular, area-by-area inspections, the
passage of a certain period of time between inspections may be a sufficient showing
of need, where there is some correlation between the period chosen and experience
with urban deterioration. (2.) The evidence necessary to support an inference of
probable cause need not necessarily meet the test required to support application
for a warrant to search for criminal evidence. 859 U.S. at 383. Thus, "slight evidence" of rat infestation might be regarded as sufficient grounds for a warrant in
circumstances similar to that in Frank; that is, where there is some independent
reason to suspect the presence of rats in the vicinity.
In either case, the discretionary act is taken out of the hands of the enforcement
officer and entrusted to a magistrate.
68. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958); Hart v. United
States, 162 F.2d 74, 76 (10th Cir. 1947).
69. See note 7 supra.
70. It might properly be argued that the health inspector's power to "determine
for himself whether reasonable cause for invasion of privacy exists is not substantially different from the same prerogative which every enforcement officer has of
determining for himself, in a particular situation, whether he must have a warrant
before proceeding to search. It is true that in both cases, the basis for the asserted
"reasonable" or "probable" cause may be judicially examined where challenged
after the search. But where the inspector need never obtain a warrant in order to
effectuate his search, the "reasonableness" of the cause on which he proceeds will
be subjected to judicial scrutiny only where the victim resists and subjects himself
to the risks of criminal prosecution, or attempts to assert a dubious cause of action
in trespass.
The real protection of privacy in the requirement that the "probable cause"
justifying a search must be judicially approved is to be found in its effect upon the
daily practice of the enforcement officer. The police officer knows that the probable
cause which will support a warrant will not necessarily justify him in searching without a warrant, except where the need for an immediate search is urgent. McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948). The health inspector, however, is assured
that he need never obtain a warrant.
The protection provided by a warrant may frequently be insubstantial, due to
judicial abdication of the responsibility for independent evaluation of probable
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enforcement officer's duty to be "reasonable" is not the protection
required by the fourth amendment. "When the right of privacy must

reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by
a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement

agent."71
It is often claimed that in an expanding welfare state the loss of

individuality and independence of spirit poses a serious threat to
the democratic ideal.72 One way in which that threat may be dimin-

ished is to preserve the security and privacy of the home from unmerited invasion by administrative officers of the state, by requiring
adherence to the traditional procedural safeguard of a warrant for

every search, issued upon a magistrate's independent evaluation of
probable cause.
cause. Through Professor Yale Kamisar of the University of Minnesota Law School,
the writer of this comment has had access to the unpublished report of the American
Bar Foundation pilot project on the administration of criminal justice in the United
States. The field reports and other data contained therein support this observation,
as do the conclusions drawn from these materials by Professor Fred E. Inbau of the
Northwestern University Law School. See also DASH, KNOWLTON & SCHWmARTZ, Tim
EAVESDROPPERS 45-46, 67 (1959). But inept administration of the constitutional
protections of the fourth amendment is hardly a justification for further dissipating
its requirements.
71. Johnson v. United States, 833 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). (Emphasis added.)
72. Cf. Foreword to HAYEr, TEE RoAD To SmDom xiv (1944):
[T]he most important change which extensive government control produces is
a psychological change, an alteration in the character of the people.. . . [Elven
a strong tradition of political liberty is no safeguard if the danger is precisely
that new institutions and policies will gradually undermine and destroy that
spirit.
The threat and exercise of government control through inspections by health officials
is different only in form from the extensive economic controls which concerned
Hayek. The relatively less intense supervision which inheres in court protection of
privacy from such inspections is the better constitutional choice.

